Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18 : CIA-RDP84T00301R000200010055-5

Director of Central
Intelligence

OCO CABLE Ed

25X1

National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

16 March 1982

Top Secret

CO NIDC 82-062C

16 March 1982 Copy 4.0 2



Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/18 : CIA-RDP84T00301R000200010055-5

	_1	Top Secret	
Cont	cents		
	Central America:	•	1
	Poland: Restless Youth		4
	International: Nuclear Proliferation		6
L	USSR-China: Prospects for Trade Talks		8
Spec	cial Analysis		

Top Secret

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X6

		Top Secret	
CENTRAL AMERICA:			
	~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~		
verbal attacks on Nat	ional Republican A	emocrats are stepping u Alliance leader D'Aubui	sson.
In Guatemala, concilio	atory gestures by	rightwing leader Sando lection of General Guev	oval
one erm of re			w•//
		cont	cinued

	Top Secret	2
		2
hristian Democratic Concerns		
altraconservative National Republican electoral climate of hatred and learty leader D'Aubuisson was involved ion of popular Archbishop Romero in communique, they likened D'Aubuisson was involved by the sould be a second by the second b	have insinuated that ed in the assassina- n 1980. In a recent	2
Comment: //The Christian Democration aw-and-order themes and promises of over the insurgents have given D'Aultoral momentum. By raising the Rome they hope to put him on the defension of the violence.//	f a swift victory buisson's party elec- ero assassination,	2
The Christian Demograts to yes	main in nower and to	
consider a postelection coalition by coderate rightist elements. They no 'Aubuisson as their major political	amswould likely ut only with more ow apparently see l challenger and con-	
preserve some of their reform programments a postelection coalition be coderate rightist elements. They not also have a consider as their major political cinue to suspect that elements in the constant of th	amswould likely ut only with more ow apparently see l challenger and con- he generally conserva-	
The Christian Democrats—to reserve some of their reform progrations a postelection coalition by noderate rightist elements. They not have a suspect that elements in the cive officer corps will abet his elements.	amswould likely ut only with more ow apparently see l challenger and con- he generally conserva-	
preserve some of their reform progra consider a postelection coalition be noderate rightist elements. They no l'Aubuisson as their major political cinue to suspect that elements in the	amswould likely ut only with more ow apparently see l challenger and con-he generally conserva-ectoral effort.	2

Top Secret	25X
Postelection Tensions Ease in Guatemala	
Rightwing leader Sandoval's party has ceased its opposition to General Guevara's election and indicated a willingness to participate in the government. Sandoval may leave the country for a month or so to allow tensions to abate.	25X
Comment: These conciliatory gestures signal the end of resistance to Guevara. Although the President-elect is unlikely to grant a significant role to Sandoval, the longtime nemesis of the Army high command, he may offer government posts to some of Sandoval's followers.	25X
Nicaragua Announces Emergency Decree	
The Nicaraguan Government issued a decree yester-day suspending citizens' "rights and guarantees" for a minimum of thirty days. Junta coordinator Daniel Ortega cited the "aggressive plans" of the US in justifying the action and implied that the recent sabotage of two bridges near the Honduran border had US backing.	25X
Comment: The measure reflects mounting Sandinista fears about US-sponsored pressure and will offer the regime new opportunities to restrict the activities of domestic moderates.	25X

Top Secret	25 <b>X</b> 1
POLAND: Restless Youth	
The Jaruzelski regime has had only marginal success intimi-dating young Poles and expects them to continue to commit acts of defiance.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Young people comprised most of a crowd of several hundred at a demonstration Saturday in Poznan to mark the end of the third month of martial law. Students also apparently took the lead in earlier protest demonstrations at Poznan and Gdansk.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	25 <b>X</b> 1
US Embassy officers who recently toured major uni- versities report that students largely ignore the martial law regulations making class attendance mandatory and prohibiting unauthorized gatherings on campus. Meanwhile, a senior Polish prelate has expressed fear that the stu- dents' naive contempt for the authorities will make them easy prey for provocations by party hardliners.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Comment: The regime has avoided using heavyhanded measures with the universities out of concern for creating martyrs that risk putting it in even less favorable light. The police on Saturday handled the demonstration in Poznan without the great show of force that was used in an earlier incident. The authorities will continue their efforts to keep student organizers off balance by selective expulsions and other forms of intimidation, and by threatening to revoke still existing academic reforms.	
chireatening to revoke Still existing addamie rere-	25X1



Top Secret	25 <b>X</b> 1
INTERNATIONAL: Nuclear Proliferation	
//Several developing countries probably will acquire uranium enrichment technology during the 1980s. thus increasing the threat of nuclear proliferation.//	25X
//Plutonium production formerly was the most accessible path to a nuclear weapons capability, but enriched uranium can now be produced by a variety of technically feasible and economically supportable processes. Countries currently employing uranium enrichment processes or known to be seeking enrichment technology include Japan, Australia, India, Brazil, Mexico, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, South Korea, and Libya.//	25X
//Several incentives other than possible interest in nuclear weapons will encourage developing countries to start enrichment programs. Many want nuclear power programs for prestige or to reduce their dependence on foreign oil. Some are reluctant to remain dependent on the US or other foreign suppliers for enrichment of uranium for reactor fuel over the 30-year lifetime of a nuclear power reactor.//	25X
Comment: //Factors that have discouraged the spread of enrichment technology will be less effective in the 1980s. Denial of technology will become less effective than when only a few countries controlled gaseous diffusion technology, and when alternate methods of enrichment were only in the research stage.//	25X
//Enrichment processes now available can be adapted to small production units that are less costly to construct than plants using the gaseous diffusion process. Moreover, the cost of producing enriched uranium for reactor fuel is only a fraction of the overall cost of nuclear power, and many countries may consider security of supply the overriding factor.//	25X



Top Secret
USSR-CHINA: Prospects for Trade Talks
The annual talks, which are to open in Beijing soon, probably will result in agreement on at least some increase over the \$200 million total trade exchanged last year. The Chinese indicate that there probably will be an increase in trade but insist that it will not denote any weakening of their anti-Soviet policy. The Soviets, however, are claiming that a Chinese proposal for a large increase is a positive sign for Sino-Soviet relations.
Comment: Bilateral trade is unlikely to be significantly higher this year than \$500 million, the average during the late 1970s. The level will partly depend on
Soviet willingness to sell timber and chemicals or Chi-
nese willingness to pay in hard currency.

25X1

25X1

Top Secret	2
SPECIAL ANALYSIS	
USSR: Capability To Project Power by Air	2
The progress being made by the Soviets' Military Transport Aviation force gives them a growing capability to move substantial military forces long distances. As the IL-76 continues to replace the aging AN-12 transport, movement of a force as large as an airborne division is becoming increasingly practical. The need for overflight clearances, lack of an aerial refueling capability, and the limited ranges of most military transports, however, remain serious constraints.	2
In the early 1970s, the force was not capable of moving large units long distances. The bulk of the transport force720 of 770 aircraftwas made up of AN-12s, which have an operational range of 2,000 nautical miles when carrying military units.	2
By the mid-1970s, the force had acquired a fleet of 58 long-range AN-22 aircraft, which are capable of carrying bulky, heavy loads. Although the AN-22 was an important addition, the small number of these aircraft was not sufficient for large-scale, long-distance movements.	
The IL-76, the transport force's first fanjet air-craft, began to replace the AN-12 in 1974. It has twice the maximum payload of the AN-12 and reduces the number of flights required to move military units by about 40 percent. The IL-76's high fuel consumption and lack of an aerial refueling capability, however, limit its useful range for moving large military units to about 3,000 nautical miles.	;
The AN-22s and the IL-76s now comprise about one-third of the transport force's inventory but account for more than half of its lift capability. By 1985, these aircraft will make up about one-half of the force and account for approximately three-fourths of its lift capability. continued	
Top Secret	,

	Top Secret	25X1
New Capabilities		·
This growing inventory of larger the Soviets to transport a more heavil division with increased firepower and They have fully mechanized most of the sions, with armored combat vehicles for companies, additional assault guns and and twice the motor transport of the a of the mid-1970s. Moving such a division practical before the addition of the I	y equipped airborne ground mobility. eir airborne divi- or all infantry field artillery, airborne division sion by air was not	- 25X1
The air transport force has played role in supporting the Soviet presence World. Moscow's involvement in Third has increased from military assistance occasional use of Soviet combat forces roles, to extensive use of Cuban combat	e in the Third World conflicts e programs, to s in defensive	25X1
Most materiel sent to client state ered by ship, but urgently required it transported by military aircraft bearimarkings. In December 1979, the Sovie units to Afghanistan to gain control out the coup that installed a pro-Sovie	ems have been ng false Aeroflot ets flew airborne of Kabul and ca <u>rry</u>	25X1
The transport force can fly the a of a mechanized airborne division, includivision's combat equipment, approxima miles in a single lift and land it. Us conditions, it could, if unopposed, transchanized airborne division to Syria a week, to Aden in two to three weeks, in four to six weeks. Such an operation about 600 to 700 flights.	cluding all of the ately 2,500 nautical ander favorable ansport an entire in a few days to or to Mozambique	25X1
Constraints and Limitations		,
The Military Transport Aviation f strated its capability to conduct larg range movements and modest long-range long-range movement of a large militar entire mechanized airborne division to would, however, involve more complex of	re-scale, medium- operations. A ry force, such as an o Aden or Mozambique	
	Top Secret	
. 10		25 <b>X</b> 1

Acquisition of overflight clearanc refueling sites would be essential and most serious uncertainty for any extern the Soviets. The lack of aerial refuel sitate stops after 2,000 to 3,000 nauti	will remain al operatior ing would ne	the by
Other potentially serious limitaticapacity of airfields and the availabil quantities of fuel in the Third World. operation to most potential destination World would require special arrangement fuel at the destination and at intermed	ity of suffi Any large-s s in the Thi s for resupp	cale rd
The transport force will not realitial for long-range operations without of crews to aircraft. The current number moreover, could sustain a large operation short period.	a higher rat er of crews,	io
DIA Comment		
DIA concurs that the continual imp	rovement of	

Military Transport Aviation capabilities is making the transport of airborne forces over long distances an increasingly practical option. DIA believes, however, that, for the general conditions mentioned in the article, the useful range of the IL-76 is approximately 5,000 nautical miles. Such a capability would reduce the deployment time of an entire airborne division to Syria by about one day, to Aden by about two to four days, and to Mozambique by as much as one week. Insertion of smaller airborne elements could take place much earlier.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

